[]

CONSIDERATIONS UPON THE AUGMENTATION OF THE ARMY. ADDRESS'D to the PUBLICK.

Simul parta ac Sperata decora unius horae
Fortuna evertere poteſt.
T. Liv.

DUBLIN: Printed for H. BRADLEY, in Dame-ſtreet. M,DCC,LXVIII.

CONSIDERATIONS Upon the Augmentation of the ARMY on the ESTABLISHMENT of IRELAND.

[3]

AS the Scheme for augmenting the Army on the Eſtabliſhment of Ireland with three Thouſand two Hundred and thirty-five Men, excites a good deal of Curioſity at preſent, it may not be unacceptable to the Public, to know what are the Sentiments of a ſincere Well-wiſher to his Country, uninfluenced by Paſſion, Prejudice, or private Intereſt, upon this very important Subject.

[4]THE Objections which have been yet urged againſt this Meaſure, even with any Degree of Plauſibility, may be fairly reduced within a very narrow Compaſs.

THE extraordinary Expence to be incurr'd the firſt Year, of near ſeventy Thouſand Pounds, and the annual Expence afterwards, of about thirty-five Thouſand, for the Support of this increaſed Eſtabliſhment. The Probability that twelve thouſand Men will not remain in Ireland for the Defence of the Country: And the Inexpediency of increaſing our military Force in a Time of Peace, and apparent Security.

IT were to be wiſhed, that this, and every other Scheme of public [5] Utility, could be carried into Execution, without laying the ſmalleſt Burthen upon the People: But as this in the Beginning, has ſeldom been found practicable in any Age, or Country; let us examine the Weight of the firſt Objection, upon the fair Footing of a Compariſon between the ſlight Inconvenience of raiſing the Sums requiſite for this Purpoſe, and the great Advantages derived to this Kingdom from ſo prudent and neceſſary an Application of them. A ſlight Inconvenience it may well be called, for by the equitable Tax of four Shillings in the Pound impoſed upon Abſentees this Seſſion of Parliament, and by the contingent Produce of the altered Duty upon Teas, a new Fund will be added to the Revenue nearly equal (according to the beſt Calculations) [6] to the whole annual Charge of the propoſed Augmentation: And this too without any Oppreſſion to the landed or mercantile Intereſt of the Country.

IT appears then, that for a moderate Sum, not exceeding what may, perhaps, be ſpent in vicious Hoſpitality, at two or three conteſted County Elections, a reſpectable Body of Forces may be maintained in this Country, to protect us from Inſurrections at Home, and againſt Invaſions from Abroad; the Reliefs which Ireland is to furniſh to Garriſons, and Settlements, will be compleat. and regular; and our Army no longer ſubject to that pernicious, (though hitherto unavoidable) Practice of Draughting, which like a ſlow Diſtemper, has conſumed the Vigor of our ſtouteſt Corps.

[7]BUT it will be ſaid, what Pledge is given us, that twelve Thouſand Men will continue in Ireland, to defend the Country that ſupports them? Superadded to the Faith of the Royal Declaration, to this Effect, we have the Security of an Act of the Britiſh Legiſlature, which, while it enables his Majeſty to augment his Army, ſpecifies at the ſame Time, the Place and Purpoſe of their Service: And in the Ballance of Candor and Juſtice, ſuch Aſſurances will certainly preponderate againſt the vague Conjectures of uninform'd Writers, or the jealous Aſſertions of a peeviſh and turbulent Incendiary. It requires no very comprehenſive Memory to regiſter Engagements from the Throne, which have been entered into ſince his preſent [8] Majeſty's Acceſſion, and till ſome Violation of them is charged and proved, we may, I think ſafely rely upon the Honour of our Sovereign, that he will give no Reaſon to miſtruſt his want of a Principle, which among the loweſt Orders of his Subjects, is ſcarcely dignified with the Name of a Virtue, but is rather conſidered as an indiſpenſable Rule of Morality, which Men muſt not depart from, while they expect to live with ordinary Credit in Society, and to reap the Benefits, which, Truth, the great Bond of it, intitles them to.

IN Time of Peace, to be prepared for War, is a Maxim of ſound Policy in every Country: To none can it be more applicable than to [9] ours, no where ſhould it be more frequently inculcated, and no where does it ſeem leſs underſtood.

The Fertility of our Iſland invites, and its Acceſſability expoſes us to Invaſion. We muſt ſtill conſider the two great Monarchies of the Continent as inſeparably united by Compact, by joint Intereſt, and join Ambition. France, which has long influenced the Councils, and ſo lately guided the Arms of Spain, is averſe to Great Britain, from Commercial Emulation, from the recent Diſhonour of her Arms, and from long Habits of Hoſtility. The complicated Intereſts of the Britiſh Colonies, her numerous Dependancies, and enterpriſing Spirit, may eaſily furniſh a Pretence to theſe two [10] Powers for a Rupture with her, when they are again in a Condition to buſtle for Dominion, and the next War may probably begin, where the laſt pretty nearly concluded, with another Attempt to invade us. Expelled, as France is, from the Continent of North America, her Efforts will be exerted ſlowly, if ever, to regain a Footing in that Quarter. Her Fleets can't cope with thoſe of England in the Weſt-Indies, and the Leeward Iſlands; the Settlements in Aſia are too remote and well eſtabliſhed: And the Garriſons of Minorca and Gibralter, are now rendered almoſt impregnable.—What Object then remains ſo inviting? What enterprize ſo practicable as a Deſcent upon Ireland? Abounding with Harbours, Bays and [11] landing Places; unfurniſhed with Forts and Soldiers: Where too, the unhappy Prevalence of the Religion of our Enemies, which keeps much the greateſt Number of our Countrymen in a diſcontented and fearful Subjection to the Government they live under, renders their Loyalty ſuſpicious; and in this Reſpect, Population, one great Means of Safety in other States, ſuggeſts nothing to us, but the Idea of Danger. A little Attention to the internal Condition of this Kingdom, will be ſufficient to convince every impartial Perſon, that this Deſcription is not overloaded, and it would be well no Doubt, if ſuch a State of Imbecility could not be aggravated.—The haſty Charts of Geographers who ſeldom viſit the Countries the pretend [12] to delineate, but deliver to the World Errors taken upon the Credit of thoſe who went before them: The Intelligence of Merchants, or more inaccurate Deſcriptions of ſuch as travel from Curioſity, or for Amuſement, are the Means by which Countries are generally known to each other, and many hoſtile Projects have been formed, upon ſuch fallible Authorities, and many have miſcarried becauſe they were ſo formed.—In reſpect to Ireland, an Enemy has peculiar Advantages. Men born and educated in every Province, in every Town, in every Corner and Spot of this Iſland, are to be found in the Dominions and under the Allegiance of France and Spain. They have our Natives to fill their Levies, and our Mariners to Pilot their Veſſels. [13] The very Indigence of theſe Fugitives renders them formidable, as it drives them to embrace a Profeſſion in theſe martial Governments, which furniſhes an immediate Subſiſtence; and finding it impoſſible to be any Thing at home, they become Soldiers from Neceſſity abroad. Let us not deſpiſe their rude Education and uncultivated Talents, they have Science enough to be uſeful to our Enemies, and dangerous to us. Ireland they ſtill conſider as their natural Inheritance, and the Claim of original Poſſeſſion is tranſmitted amongſt them from Generation to Generation. To reviſit the Land of their Fore-fathers, and to enjoy again the Property they have forfeited, is the favourite Topic of their Diſcourſes, and the Object ever preſent [14] to their Hopes. Bold and ready for Battle upon any Pretence, and in every Quarrel, they are animated with no common Ardor when this Enterprize is ſtarted. Innovators and Robbers are the Characters we are deſcribed under; and, as ſuch, ſhould the fatal Opportunity happen, we muſt expect to be treated. It is a fact too notorious to be conteſted, and too recent to be forgotten, how we were once preſerved from the worſt of all Calamities which hung over us; and had not the ſuperintending Vigilance of our Mother Country interpoſed at that Juncture, we might now perhaps in Poverty, in Baniſhment, or in Priſons deplore the Conſequences of an Event, which, whether we may be again expoſed to it, or not, we at [15] preſent only diſcuſs the Probability of.

To thoſe who are candid enough to acknowledge what indeed can ſcarcely be conteſted, that the Conqueſt of Ireland, at leaſt the Devaſtation of it, will be a likely Object of our Enemies Policy; but who argue that even a greater Number than our propoſed Eſtabliſhment would be inſufficient to defend it; the Anſwer is obvious. Twelve Thouſand Men are a better Defence than a third Part of the Number, and three times as much may reaſonably be expected from them. Open the above Argument a little more, place it in a fairer Light, and then examine what is the Force of it. Our Iſland is extenſive, [16] and expoſed every where; then how is it poſſible for a handful of Soldiers, though never ſo brave, alert, and well diſciplined, to be preſent at the ſame Inſtant in many Places? The Attack may be made at once in different Quarters, and while we March to ſuſtain one Poſt, we leave another open to the Invador? Beſides, a watchful Eye muſt be kept upon the People who ſurround us, leſt their Riſing ſhould be as fatal as the landing of an Enemy.

Under ſuch Circumſtances it muſt be admitted, that an Army would have much to do, and all Lovers of their Country much more to fear. At ſuch a Criſis, the thriftieſt Stewards of the public Purſe, [17] the moſt watchful Dragons of the Exchequer, might probably wiſh in vain to make one common Maſs of public and private Property; and to exchange it all for what is ſtill more precious, ſecurity of Life, and Liberty to enjoy it. Yet from twelve thouſand brave Soldiers, every Thing may be expected but Impoſſibilities: nor can it be ſtrictly ſaid, that we need defend equally the whole of our extenſive Coaſts, ſince 'tis probable the Northern Parts of them will not be attempted. The Religion of the Inhabitants, their Wealth and Numbers, are well known to the two Maritime Powers from whence we have any Thing to apprehend: nor ſhould it be ſuppoſed they will endeavour to make an [18] Impreſſion in the Quarter, where they muſt expect to meet the moſt vigorous Reſiſtance. The landing of Flobert and Thurot near Carrickfergus, in the Year 1760, was the Effect of Accident and not Deſign. The Deſtination of that little Squadron ('tis well known) was for the South, though by Diſtreſs, and contrary Winds, they were reduced to the Neceſſity of Anchoring in the North; where it was not at firſt intended. 'Tis then reaſonable to conclude, that the Southern, and South-Weſt Parts, are to be principally attended to; as the ſame Reaſons which endangered them before, exiſt in full Force at this Inſtant. Here then we muſt be prepared to expect an Enemy, and 'tis ſomething at leaſt in our Favour, to know [19] where Preparation is neceſſary. Let it be conſidered beſides, that no Armament can Approach the Coaſt, without giving Notice of it by their Appearance: And that Diſembarkations are more ſubject to Delay, Confuſion and Accident, than any other Military Operations.

The Strength and Spirit of the Soldiery, upon ſuch Services, is enfeebled by the unwholeſome Confinement in the Veſſels that tranſport them, and by the Effects of an Element to which they are not accuſtomed. If they meet with no Oppoſition, but can Diſembark, Form and March forwards with as little Reſiſtance, and in as good Order, as if they came to relieve a Garriſon, or to take quiet Poſſeſſion [20] of an undiſputed Territory, the Caſe is very different; if ſo indeed, I know not what we have to reſort to, except Supplications, and their Mercy; but in my poor Opinion, the Appearance of a ſingle Regiment or Company of our own Soldiers, would be a much ſafer, and more honourable Reſource in ſuch a Calamity. Peaſants, Children and Women have hurled ſtones, and brandiſhed Clubs, have done ſomething, in ſuch Cauſes; and ſhall we now be told, that twelve thouſand brave Soldiers, ſuch as by their excellent Diſcipline and unexampled Courage, have raiſed the Reputation of theſe Nations above all others this Day in Europe: Shall we be told, I ſay, that they can do nothing? And will it ſtill be urged [21] that except their Numbers are encreaſed beyond what 'tis poſſible to encreaſe them, they are a Burthen and not a Bulwark.

Much illiberal Induſtry 'tis true has been of late exerted to raiſe unfavourable Impreſſions of the Soldiery in the Minds of their Countrymen, and impotent Malice has exhauſted all her pitiful Expedients, to ſow the Seeds of Diviſion and Jealouſy, between the Civil and Military Powers. Invidious Inſinuations, invented Anecdotes, ridiculous Calculations, falſe Facts, falſe Arguments, and bold Calumnies have been obtruded upon the Public, for Reaſons to Prejudice their Senſe of a Meaſure, which is ſhortly [22] to be decided by their Repreſentatives in Parliament. There no doubt, the Merit of this Queſtion will be determined properly upon the Information which is before them: They will not prefer an inconſiderable Saving to a great Security, nor ſuſpect a lurking Miſchief under a fair Propoſition, becauſe they have not themſelves ſuggeſted it. As the Crown advances in Condeſcenſion, they will not recede in Confidence, nor while the Neceſſity of an additional Defence to their Country, is on all Sides admitted; poſtpone an expeditious and practicable Mode of defending it, to one which is viſionary, or at beſt precarious. In examining the Scheme before them, they will conſider all the [23] Relations of their Country, and reſpect the Means propoſed; as they regard one great End, its Security and Preſervation.

FINIS.
Distributed by the University of Oxford under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License

Citation Suggestion for this Object
TextGrid Repository (2016). TEI. 5420 Considerations upon the augmentation of the army Address d to the publick. University of Oxford Text Archive. University of Oxford, License: Distributed by the University of Oxford under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License [http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/]. https://hdl.handle.net/11378/0000-0005-DF45-3