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Printed for John Bell Britiſh Library Strand London. Jany. 21st. 178 [...]
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Printed for John Bell, Britiſh Library Strand, London. Jany. 25th. 1782.
THE POETICAL WORKS OF MARK AKENSIDE.
IN TWO VOLUMES.
WITH THE LIFE OF THE AUTHOR.
VOL. I.
EDINBURG: AT THE Apollo Preſs, BY THE MARTINS. Anno 1781.
THE POETICAL WORKS OF MARK AKENSIDE.
VOL. I.
CONTAINING HIS PLEASURES OF THE IMAGINATION, &c. &c. &c.
EDINBURG: AT THE Apollo Preſs, BY THE MARTINS. Anno 1781.
THE LIFE OF MARK AKENSIDE.
[]MARK AKENSIDE, an eminent poet and phyſician, was born at Newcaſtle upon Tyne the 9th Nov. 1721. He was ſecond ſon of Mark Akenſide, a ſubſtantial butcher of that town: his mother's name was Mary Lumſden. At the freeſchool of Newcaſtle young Akenſide received the firſt part of his education; he was next committed to the care of Mr. Wilſon, a diſ⯑ſenting clergyman who kept a private academy at Newcaſtle.
About the eighteenth year of his age our Author was ſent to the univerſity of Edinburgh, in the view of qualifying himſelf for the duties of a Preſbyterian paſtor, his parents and relations in general being of the Preſbyterian ſect. Mr. Akenſide received ſome aſſiſtance from the funds which the Engliſh Diſſenters employ in educating young men of no opulent for⯑tunes; but his views as to the miniſtry altering, he bent his ſtudies towards phyſick, and honeſtly repaid to his benefactors the money they had advanced for him, which being contributed for a different purpoſe than promoting the ſtudy of phyſick he thought it diſho⯑nourable to retain. Whether in relinquiſhing his de⯑ſign of being a Diſſenting clergyman he alſo ceaſed to be a Diſſenter is not certainly known.
[vi] Akenſide's genius and taſte for poetry diſplayed themſelves early when at Newcaſtle ſchool, and du⯑ring his continuance at Mr. Wilſon's academy. His Pleaſures of Imagination, with ſeveral other poems, [...] ſaid, were firſt written by him at Morpeth while upon a viſit to his relations, and before he went to the univerſity of Edinburgh, where he alſo diſtinguiſhed himſelf by his poetical compoſitions. His Ode on the Winter Solſtice, which is dated 1740, was certainly compoſed at that place.
After three years ſtudy at Edinburgh Mr. Aken⯑ſide went (1741) to Leyden, where on 16th May 1744 he took his degree of Doctor in Phyſick. Same year appeared his Pleaſures of Imagination, a poem which procured him ſome emolument and much re⯑putation. This poem was followed by An Epiſtle to Curio, an acrimonious attack on the political con⯑duct of William Pulteney Earl of Bath, whom he ſtigmatizes under the name of Curio as the betrayer of his country, alſo publiſhed in the 1744. Akenſide diſſatisfied with this performance altered it exceed⯑ingly: he converted the Epiſtle into an Ode, and re⯑duced it to leſs than half the number of lines of which it originally conſiſted. In the 1745 he publiſhed his firſt Collection of Odes, ten in number. In 1748 came out his Ode to the Earl of Huntingdon; and in 1758 he attempted to rouſe the national ſpirit by An Ode to the Country Gentlemen of England. Few of his re⯑maining [vii] poems were publiſhed ſeparately, excepting the Ode to Thomas Edwards, Eſq. which though written in 1751 was not printed till the year 1766. The reſt of Dr. Akenſide's poems which appeared in his lifetime were given, at leaſt for the moſt part, in the ſixth volume of Dodſley's Collection.
Soon after his return from Leyden he commenced phyſician at Northampton, where Dr. Stonehouſe then practiſed with reputation and ſucceſs. Whilſt here he carried on an amicable debate with Dr. Dod⯑dridge concerning the opinions of the ancient philo⯑ſophers with regard to a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments, in which Dr. Akenſide ſupported the firm belief of Cicero in particular in this great article of natural religion. Not meeting with ſufficient en⯑couragement at Northampton, or being ambitious of a larger field in which to diſplay his talents, he re⯑moved to Hampſtead, where he reſided upwards of two years, and then finally fixed himſelf in London.
At London he was well known as a poet, but had ſtill to force his way as a phyſician. At firſt he had but little practice, and would probably have been reduced to difficulties had not Mr. Dyſon, his intimate friend, generouſly allowed him 300l. a year, which enabled him to make a proper appearance in the world. In time the Doctor acquired conſiderable reputation and practice, and arrived at moſt of the honours incident to his profeſſion: he became a Fellow of the Royal [viii] Society, a Phyſician to St. Thomas's Hoſpital, was ad⯑mitted by mandamus to the degree of Doctor in Phy⯑ſick in the univerſity of Cambridge, and elected a Fel⯑low of the Royal College of Phyſicians in London, and upon the ſettlement of the Queen's houſehold was appointed one of the Phyſicians to her Majeſty. He perhaps might have ſtill roſe to a greater eleva⯑tion of character had not his ſtudies ended with his life by a putrid fever 23d June 1770, in the 49th year of his age. He was buried in the pariſh of St. James's Weſtminſter.
Dr. Akenſide was much devoted to the ſtudy of ancient literature, and was a great admirer of Plato, Cicero, and the beſt philoſophers of antiquity. His knowledge and taſte in this reſpect are conſpicuous in his poems, and in the Notes and Illuſtrations which he hath annexed to them. That he had a ſincere re⯑verence for the great and fundamental principles of religion is apparent from numberleſs paſſages in his writings. His high veneration for the Supreme Being, his noble ſentiments of the wiſdom and benevolence of the Divine Providence, and his zeal for the cauſe of virtue, are conſpicuous in all his poems. His re⯑gard to the Chriſtian revelation, and his ſolicitude to have it preſerved in its native purity, are diſplayed in the Ode to the Biſhop of Wincheſter, His attachment to the cauſe of civil and religious liberty is a diſtin⯑guiſhed feature in the character of his poetical writ⯑ings: [ix] he embraces every occaſion of diſplaying his ardour concerning this ſubject; and two of his Odes, thoſe to the Earl of Huntingdon and the Biſhop of Wincheſter, are directly conſecrated to it.
Dr. Akenſide is to be conſidered as a didactick and lyrick poet. His chief work, The Pleaſures of Ima⯑gination, was received with great applauſe, and raiſed the Author's reputation high in the poetical world. Pope, on looking into the manuſcript before publica⯑tion, is reported to have ſaid ‘"That the Author was no every-day writer."’ Mr. Cooper, in his Letters concerning Taſte, ſpeaks of Akenſide in the follow⯑ing ſtrain of commendation: ‘"For my part I am of opinion that there is now living a poet of as genu⯑ine a genius as this kingdom ever produced, Shake⯑ſpeare alone excepted. By poetical genius I do not mean the mere talent of making verſes, but that glorious enthuſiaſm of ſoul, that fine phrenſy, in which the poet's eye rowling glances from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven, as Shakeſpeare feelingly deſcribes it. This alone is poetry; aught elſe is a mechanical art of putting ſyllables harmonicuſly to⯑gether. The gentleman I mean is Dr. Akenſide, the worthy Author of The Pleaſures of Imagination, the moſt beautiful didactick poem that ever adorned the Engliſh language."’ On the other hand the late Mr. Gray, in a letter to Mr. Wharton of Old Park near Durham, dated Peterhouſe 26th April 1744, [x] (Maſon's 4to edit. of Gray, p. 178.) ſays, ‘"You de⯑ſire to know, it ſeems, what character the poem of your young friend (Dr. Akenſide) bears here. I wonder that you aſk the opinion of a nation where thoſe who pretend to judge do not judge at all, and the reſt (the wiſer part) wait to catch the judg⯑ment of the world immediately above them, that is, Dick's and the Rainbow coffeehouſes. Your readier way would be to aſk the ladies who keep the bars in thoſe two theatres of criticiſm. However, to ſhew you that I am a judge as well as my countrymen, I will tell you, though I have rather turned it over than read it, (Pleaſures of Imagination) but no mat⯑ter, no more have they, that it ſeems to me above the middling, and now and then, for a little while, riſes even to the beſt, particularly in deſcription. It is often obſcure, and even unintelligible, and too much infected with the Hutchinſon jargon. In ſhort, its great fault is that it was publiſhed at leaſt nine years too early. And ſo methinks, in a few words, a la mode du Temple. I have very prettily diſ⯑patched what perhaps may for ſeveral years have employed a very ingenious man worth fifty of my⯑ſelf."’
‘"As theſe obſervations were haſtily delivered in a private letter, before the poem had been maturely examined, we may be allowed (ſay the writers of The Biographia to think them too ſevere, and to [xi] ſteer a middle courſe between Mr. Gray and Mr. Cooper. The obſcurity of The Pleaſures of Imagi⯑nation, when read with attention, will chiefly be found in the allegory of the ſecond book, which we freely confeſs we could never underſtand. It might likewiſe have been better if the peculiar language of Hutchinſon, or rather of Shafteſbury, had ſome⯑times been omitted. Nevertheleſs we cannot but regard it as a noble and beautiful poem, exhibiting many bright diſplays of genius and fancy, and hold⯑ing out ſublime views of Nature, Providence, and morality. We concur with Mr. Gray in thinking it was publiſhed too early: the Author himſelf be⯑came afterwards of the ſame ſentiment; he was con⯑vinced that the poem was defective in ſome re⯑ſpects, and redundant in others."’ ‘"That it want⯑ed reviſion and correction,"’ says Mr. Dyſon, his editor, ‘"he was ſufficiently ſenſible; but ſo quick was the demand for ſeveral ſucceſſive republications, that in any of the intervals to have completed the whole of his corrections was utterly impoſſible; and yet to have gone on from time to time in making farther improvements in every new edition would, he thought, have had the appearance at leaſt of abu⯑ſing the favour of the publick: he choſe therefore to continue for ſome time reprinting it without al⯑teration, and to forbear publiſhing any corrections or improvements until he ſhould be able at once to [xii] give them to the publick complete: and with this view he went on for ſeveral years to review and correct his poem at leiſure, till at length he found the taſk grow ſo much upon his hands, that deſpair⯑ing of ever being able to execute if ſufficiently to his own ſatisfction he abandoned the purpoſe of cor⯑recting, and reſolved to write the poem over anew, upon a ſomewhat different and an enlarged plan."’
Dr. Akenſide did not live to finiſh the whole of his plan: that part of it which is carried into execution occurs next in this edition, and the reader may judge of the Doctor's intentions by having recourſe to the Ge⯑neral Argument prefixed to the poem. He deſigned at firſt to compromiſe the whole of his ſubject, accord⯑ing to a new plan, in four books; but he afterwards changed his purpoſe, and determined to diſtribute The Pleaſures of Imagination into a greater number of books. How far his ſcheme would have carried him, if he had lived to complete it, is uncertain, for at his death he had only finiſhed the firſt and ſecond books, a conſiderable part of the third, and the introduction to the fourth. The firſt book of the improved work bears a nearer reſemblance to the firſt book of the former editions than any of the reſt do to each other: there are nevertheleſs in this book a great number of correc⯑tions and alterations, and ſeveral conſiderable additi⯑ons. Dr Akenſide has introduced a tribute of reſpect and affection to his friend Mr. Dyſon; he has referred [xiii] The Pleaſures of Imagination to two ſources only, Greatneſs and Beauty, and not to three, as he had heretofore done: his delineation of beautiful objects is much enlarged; and, upon the whole, the firſt book ſeems to have received no ſmall degree of improve⯑ment. The ſecond book is very different from the ſe⯑cond book of the preceeding editions: the difference indeed is ſo great that they cannot be compared toge⯑ther. The Author enters into a diſplay of Truth and its three claſſes, matter of Fact, experimental or ſcien⯑tifical Truth, and univerſal Truth. He treats likewiſe of Virtue, as exiſting in the Divine Mind, of human virtue, of Vice and its origin, of Ridicule, and of the Passions. What he hath ſaid upon the ſubject of ridi⯑cule is greatly and advantageouſly reduced from what it was in the former copies. The enumeration of the different ſources of ridicule is left out, and conſequently ſomelines which had given offence to Dr. Warburton. The allegorical Viſion which heretofore conſtituted a principal part of the ſecond book is likewiſe omitted. The poetical character of the ſecond book, as it now ſtands, is, that it is correct, moral, and noble. The third book is an epiſode, in which Solon the Athenian lawgiver is the chief character; and the deſign of it ſeems to be, to ſhew the great influence of poetry in enforcing the cauſe of Liberty. This part is entirely new, and if it had been finiſhed would have proved a beautiful addition to the poem. It is greatly to be re⯑gretted [xiv] that Dr. Akenſide did not live to complete his deſign; nevertheleſs we ſhould have been ſorry to have had the original poem entirely ſuperſeded. What⯑ever may be its faults there is in it a certain brightneſs and brilliancy of imagination, and a certain degree of enthuſiaſm, which the Doctor did not ſeem to have poſſeſſed in equal vigour in the latter part of his life. Years, and an application to ſcientifick ſtudies, appear in ſome meaſure to have turned his mind from ſound to things, from fancy to the underſtanding.
Dr. Johnſon, in his life of Akenſide, ſays of this poem, ‘"It has undoubtedly a juſt claim to very par⯑ticular notice, as an example of great felicity of ge⯑nius, and uncommon amplitude of acquiſitions, of a young mind ſtored with images, and much exer⯑ciſed in combining and comparing them."’ Of the altered work he adds, ‘"He ſeems to have ſomewhat contracted his diffuſion; but I know not whether he has gained in cloſeneſs what he has loſt in ſplen⯑dour."’
‘"To The Pleaſures of Imagination,"’ continue the authors of The Biographia, ‘"ſucceed two books of Odes, the firſt containing eighteen, the ſecond fif⯑teen odes. It was Dr. Akenſide's intention, if he had lived, to have made each book conſiſt of twenty odes. Thoſe which had been formerly publiſhed are greatly altered and improved. The Doctor's odes are not equal to the beautiful productions of [xv] Mr Gray, nor perhaps to thoſe of one or two living writers; but ſtill there is in them a noble vein of poetry, united with manly ſenſe, and applied to ex⯑cellent purpoſes. This encomium cannot be extend⯑ed to the whole of the odes without exception: Dr. Akenſide does not always preſerve the dignity of the lyrick Muſe: he is defective in the pathetick even upon a ſubject which peculiarly required it, and where it might have been moſt expected, the death of his miſtreſs, we mean his Ode to the Even⯑ing Star. However, his Hymn to Cheerfulneſs, and his Odes on leaving Holland, on Lyrick Poetry, to the Earl of Huntingdon, and on Recovering from a ſit of Sickneſs, juſtly entitle him to a place among the principal Lyrick writers of this country."’
‘"Of his Odes,"’ ſays Dr. Johnſon, ‘"nothing fa⯑vourable can be ſaid.—To examine ſuch compoſi⯑tions ſingly cannot be required; they have doubt⯑leſs brighter and darker parts; but when they are once found to be generally dull all further labour may be ſpared: for to what uſe can the work be criticiſed that will not be read?"’ In this diverſity of opinions the reader will determine for himſelf.
Dr. Akenſide's principal medical performance was, 1. His Diſſertatio de Dyſenteria, publiſhed in 1764, which has been commended as an elegant ſpecimen of Latinity: it was twice tranſlated into Engliſh. He alſo wrote, 2. Obſervations on the Origin and Uſe of [xvi] the Lymphatick Veſſels in Animals. 3. An Account of a Blow on the Heart, and its Effects. 4. Oratio Anniverſaria, ex Inſtituto Harveii, in Theatro Col⯑legii Regalis Modicorum Londinenſis habita, Anno 1759. 5. Obſervations on Cancers. 6. Of the Uſe of Ipecacuanha in Aſthmas. 7. A Method of treating White Swellings of the Joints. Beſides theſe he read at the College ſome Practical Obſervations made at St. Thomas's Hoſpital on the putrid Eryſipelas, which he intended forthe ſecond volume of The Medical Tranſ⯑actions. This paper he carried home with a deſign to correct it, but it was not returned at the time of his death. Being appointed Cronian Lecturer he choſe for his ſubject ‘"The Hiſtory of the Revival of Learn⯑ing,"’ and read three lectures on it before the College, but from which he ſoon deſiſted, it was ſuppoſed in diſguſt, ſome one of the College having objected that he had choſen a ſubject foreign to the inſtitution. Moſt of the above pieces were publiſhed in The Phi⯑loſophical and Medical Tranſactions.
ADVERTISEMENT TO THE EDITION 1772.
[]THIS volume contains a complete collection of the poems of the late Dr. Akenſide, either reprinted from the original editions, or faithfully publiſhed from co⯑pies which had been prepared by himſelf for publi⯑cation.
That the principal poem ſhould appear in ſo diſad⯑vantageous a ſtate may require ſome explanation. The firſt publication of it was at a very early part of the Author's life; that it wanted reviſion and cor⯑rection he was ſufficiently ſenſible; but ſo quick was the demand for ſeveral ſucceſſive republications, that in any of the intervals to have completed the whole of his corrections was utterly impoſſible; and yet to have gone on from time to time in making farther im⯑provements in every new edition would, he thought, have had the appearance at leaſt of abuſing the favour of the publick: he choſe therefore to continue for ſome time reprinting it without alteration, and to forbear publiſhing any corrections or improvements until he ſhould be able at once to give them to the publick complete: and with this view he went on for ſeveral years to review and correct his poem at leiſure, till at length he found the taſk grow ſo much upon his hands, that deſpairing of ever being able to execute it ſuf⯑ficiently to his own ſatisfaction he abandoned the [18] purpoſe of correcting, and reſolved to write the poem over anew upon a ſomewhat different and an enlar⯑ged plan: and in the execution of this deſign he had made a conſiderable progreſs. What reaſon there may be to regret that he did not live to execute the whole of it will beſt appear from the peruſal of the plan itſelf, as ſtated in the General Argument, and of the parts which he had executed, and which are here publiſh⯑ed: for the perſon* to whom he intruſted the diſ⯑poſal of his papers would have thought himſelf want⯑ing as well to the ſervice of the publick as to the fame of his friend if he had not produced as much of the work as appeared to have been prepared for publica⯑tion. In this light he conſidered the entire firſt and ſecond books, of which a few copies had been printed for the uſe only of the Author and certain friends; alſo a very conſiderable part of the third book, which had been tranſcribed in order to its being printed in the ſame manner; and to theſe is added the introduction to a ſubſequent book, which in the manuſcript is call⯑ed the fourth, and which appears to have been com⯑poſed at the time when the Author intended to com⯑priſe the whole in four books; but which, as he had afterwards determined to diſtribute the poem into more books, might perhaps more properly be call⯑ed the laſt book. And this is all that is executed of [19] the new work, which although it appeared to the editor too valuable, even in its imperfect ſtate, to be withholden from the publick, yet (he conceives) takes in by much too ſmall a part of the original poem to ſupply its place, and to ſuperſede the republication of it; for which reaſon both the poems are inſerted in this Collection.
Of Odes the Author had deſigned to make up two books, conſiſting of twenty odes each, including the ſeveral odes which he had before publiſhed at diffe⯑rent times.
The Hymn to the Naiads is reprinted from the ſixth volume of Dodſley's Miſcellanies, with a few corrections, and the addition of ſome Notes. To the Inſcriptions, taken from the ſame volume, three new Inſcriptions are added, the laſt of which is the only inſtance wherein a liberty has been taken of inſerting any thing in this Collection which did not appear to have been intended by the Author for publication*, among whoſe papers no copy of this was found, but it is printed from a copy which he had many years ſince given to the editor.
THE DESIGN.
THERE are certain powers in human nature which ſeem to hold a middle place between the organs of bo⯑dly ſenſe and the faculties of moral perception: they have been called by a very general name ‘"The Powers of Imagination."’ Like the external ſenſes they re⯑late to matter and motion, and at the ſame time give the mind ideas analogous to thoſe of moral approba⯑tion and diſlike. As they are the inlets of ſome of the moſt exquiſite Pleaſures with which we are acquaint⯑ed, it has naturally happened that men of warm and ſenſible tempers have ſought means to recal the de⯑lightful perceptions which they afford, independent of the objects which originally produced them. This gave riſe to the imitative or deſigning arts, ſome of which, as painting and ſculpture, directly copy the external appearances which were admired in nature; others, as muſick and poetry, bring them back to remem⯑brance by ſigns univerſally eſtabliſhed and underſtood.
But theſe arts as they grew more correct and de⯑liberate were of courſe led to extend their imitation beyond the peculiar objects of the imaginative powers eſpecially poetry, which making uſe of language a [...] the inſtrument by which it imitates, is conſequently become an unlimited repreſentative of every ſpeci [...] and mode of being; yet as their intention was only to expreſs the objects of Imagination, and as they ſtill abound chiefly in ideas of that claſs, they of courſ [...] retain their original character, and all the differen [...] [21] Pleaſures which they excite are termed in general Pleaſures of Imagination.
The Deſign of the following Poem is to give a view of theſe in the largeſt acceptation of the term, ſo that whatever our Imagination feels from the agreeable appearances of nature, and all the various entertain⯑ment we meet with either in poetry, painting, muſick, or any of the elegant arts, might be deducible from one or other of thoſe principles in the conſtitution of the human mind which are here eſtabliſhed and explained.
In executing this general plan it was neceſſary firſt of all to diſtinguiſh the Imagination from our other faculties, and in the next place to characterize thoſe original forms or properties of being about which it is converſant, and which are by nature adapted to it, as light is to the eyes, or truth to the underſtanding. Theſe properties Mr. Addiſon had reduced to the three general claſſes of Greatneſs, Novelty, and Beauty; and into theſe we may analyze every object, however complex, which, properly ſpeaking, is delightful to the imagination. But ſuch an object may alſo include many other ſources of Pleaſure, and its beauty, or no⯑velty, or grandeur, will make a ſtronger impreſſion by reaſon of this concurrence. Beſides which the imi⯑tative arts, eſpecially poetry, owe much of their effect to a ſimilar exhibition of properties quite foreign to the imagination, inſomuch that in every line of the moſt applauded poems we meet with either ideas drawn from the external ſenſes, or truths diſcovered [22] to the underſtanding, or illuſtrations of contrivance and final cauſes, or, above all the reſt, with circum⯑ſtances proper to awaken and engage the paſſions; it was therefore neceſſary to enumerate and exemplify th [...]ſe different ſpecies of Pleaſure, eſpecially that from the paſſions, which as it is ſupreme in the nobleſt work of human genius, ſo being in ſome particulars not a little ſurpriſing, gave an opportunity to enliven the didactick turn of the poem by introducing an al⯑legory to account for the appearance.
After theſe parts of the ſubject which hold chiefly of admiration, or naturally warm and intereſt the mind, a Pleaſure of a very different nature, that which ariſes from Ridicule, came next to be conſidered. As this is the foundation of the comick manner in all the arts, and has been but very imperfectly treated by moral writers, it was thought proper to give it a par⯑ticular illuſtration, and to diſtinguiſh the general ſources from which the ridicule of characters is de⯑rived. Here too a change of ſtyle became neceſſary, ſuch a one as might yet be conſiſtent, if poſſible, with the general taſte of compoſition in the ſerious parts of the ſubject; nor is it an eaſy taſk to give any tolerable force to images of this kind without running eithe [...] into the gigantick expreſſions of the mock heroick, [...] the familiar and poetical raillery of profeſſed ſatire [...] neither of which would have been proper here.
The materials of all imitation being thus laid open [...] nothing now remained but to illuſtrate ſome parti⯑cular [23] Pleaſures which ariſe either from the relations of different objects one to another, or from the nature of imitation itſelf. Of the firſt kind is that various and complicated reſemblance exiſting between ſeveral parts of the material and immaterial worlds, which is the foundation of metaphor and wit. As it ſeems in a great meaſure to depend on the early aſſociation of our ideas, and as this habit of aſſociating is the ſource of many Pleaſures and pains in life, and on that ac⯑count bears a great ſhare in the influence of poetry and the other arts, it is therefore mentioned here, and its effects deſcribed: then follows a general account of the production of theſe elegant arts, and of the ſe⯑condary Pleaſure, as it is called, ariſing from the re⯑ſemblance of their imitations to the original appear⯑ances of nature: after which the work concludes with ſome reflections on the general conduct of the powers of Imagination, and on their natural and moral uſe⯑fulneſs in life.
Concerning the manner or turn of compoſition which prevails in this piece little can be ſaid with pro⯑priety by the Author. He had two models; that an⯑cient and ſimple one of the firſt Grecian poets, as it is refined by Virgil in the Georgicks, and the familiar epiſtolary way of Horace. This latter has ſeveral ad⯑vantages: it admits of a greater variety of ſtyle; it more readily engages the generality of readers, as par⯑taking more of the air of converſation, and eſpecially with the aſſiſtance of rhyme leads to a cloſer and [24] more conciſe expreſſion. Add to this the example of the moſt perfect of modern poets, who has ſo happily applied this manner to the nobleſt parts of philoſophy that the publick taſte is in a great meaſure formed to it alone. Yet, after all, the ſubject before us, tend⯑ing almoſt conſtantly to admiration and enthuſiaſm, ſeemed rather to demand a more open, pathetick, and figured ſtyle. This too appeared more natural, as the Author's aim was not ſo much to give formal pre⯑cepts, or enter into the way of direct argumentation, as by exhibiting the moſt engaging proſpects of na⯑ture to enlarge and harmonize the Imagination, and by that means inſenſibly diſpoſe the minds of men to a ſimilar taſte and habit of thinking in religion, mo⯑rals, and civil life. It is on this account that he is ſo careful to point out the benevolent intention of the Author of Nature in every principle of the human conſtitution here inſiſted on, and alſo to unite the mo⯑ral excellencies of life in the ſame point of view with the mere external objects of good taſte; thus recom⯑mending them in common to our natural propenſity for admiring what is beautiful and lovely. The ſame views have alſo led him to introduce ſome ſentiment [...] which may perhaps be looked upon as not quite di⯑rect to the ſubject; but ſince they bear an obvious re⯑lation to it the authority of Virgil, the faultleſs mo⯑del of didactick poetry, will beſt ſupport him in th [...] particular: for the ſentiments themſelves he make [...] no apology.
THE PLEASURES OF IMAGINATION.
[]BOOK I.
THE ſubjet propoſed: difficulty of treating it poetically. The ideas of the Divine Mind the origin of every quality pleaſing to the Imagina⯑tion. The natural variety of conſtitution in the minds of men, with its final cauſe. The idea of a fine Imagination, and the ſtate of the mind in the enjoyment of thoſe Pleaſures which it affords. All the primary Pleaſures of the Imagination [...] from the perception of greatneſs, or wonderfulneſs, or beauty, in objects. The Pleaſure from greatneſs, with its final cauſe: Pleaſure from novelty or wondeful⯑neſs, with its final cauſe: Pleaſure from beauty, with its final cauſe. The connexion of beauty with truth and good, applied to the conduct of life. Invitation to the ſtudy of moral philoſophy. The different de⯑grees of beauty in different ſpecies of objects; colour, ſhape, natural concretes, vegetables, animals; the mind [...] The ſublime, the fair, the wonderful, of the mind. The connexion of the Imagination and the moral faculty. Concluſion.
THE PLEASURES OF IMAGINATION.
BOOK II.
[]THE ſeparation of the works of Imagination from philoſophy the cauſe of their abuſe among the Moderns. Proſpect of their reunion under the influence of publick liberty. Enumeration of accidental Pleaſures, which increaſe the effect of objects delightful to the Imagination. The Pleaſures of ſenſe. Particular circumſtances of the mind. Diſcovery of truth. Perception of contrivance and deſign. Emotion of the paſ⯑ſions. All the natural paſſions partake of a pleaſing ſenſation; with the final cauſe of this conſtitution illuſtrated by an Allegorical Viſion, and exemplified in ſorrow, pity, terrour, and indignation.
THE PLEASURES OF IMAGINATION.
BOOK III.
[]PLEASURE in obſerving the tempers and manners of men, even where [...] or abſurd. The origin of vice, from falſe repreſentations of the fancy producing falſe opinions concerning good and evil. Inquiry into ridicule. The general ſources of ridicule in the minds and characters of men enumerated. Final cauſe of the ſenſe of ridicule. The reſem⯑blance of certain aſpects of inanimate things to the ſenſations and pro⯑perties of the mind. The operations of the mind in the production of the works of Imagination deſcribed. The ſecondary Pleaſure from imi⯑tation. The benevolent order of the world illuſtrated in the arbitrary connexion of theſe Pleaſures with the objects which excite them. The nature and conduct of taſte. Concluding with an account of the natural and moral advantages reſulting from a ſenſible and wellformed Imagi⯑nation.
THE PLEASURES OF IMAGINATION.
[]The General Argument.
THE Pleaſures of the Imagination proceed either from natural objects, as from a flouriſhing grove, a clear and murmuring fountain, a calm ſea by moonlight, or from works of art, ſuch as a noble edifice, a muſical tune, a [...], a picture, a poem. In treating of th [...]ſe Pleaſures we muſt begin with the former claſs, they being original to the other; and nothing more being neceſſary in order to explain them than a view of our natural inclination to⯑ward greatneſs and beauty, and of thoſe appearances in the world around us to which that inclination is adapted. This is the ſubject of the firſt book of the following poem.
But the Pleaſures which we receive from the elegant arts, from muſick, ſculpture, painting, and poetry, are much more various and complicated. In them (beſides great⯑neſs and beauty, or forms proper to the Imagination) we find interwoven frequent repreſentations of truth, of vir⯑tue and vice, of circumſtances proper to move us with laughter, or to encite in us pity, fear, and the other paſ⯑ſions. Th [...]ſe moral and intellectual objects are deſcribed in the ſecond book, to which the third properly belongs as an epiſode, though too large to have been included in it.
With the abovementioned cauſes of Pleaſure, which are univerſal in the courſe of human life, and appertain to [115] our higher faculties, many others do generally concur, more limited in their operation, or of an inferiour origin; ſuch are the novelty of objects, the aſſociation of ideas, af⯑fections of the bodily ſenſes, influences of education, na⯑tional habits, and the like. To illuſtrate theſe, and from the whole to determine the character of a perfect taſte, is the argument of the fourth book.
Hitherto the Pleaſures of the Imagination belong to the hu⯑man ſpecies in general; but there are certain particular men whoſe Imagination is endowed with powers and ſuſceptible of Pleaſures which the generality of mankind never participate: theſe are the men of genius, deſtined by Nature to excel in one or other of the arts already men⯑tioned. It is propoſed therefore in the laſt place, to de⯑lineate that genius which in ſome degree appears common to them all, yet with a more peculiar conſideration of poe⯑try, inaſmuch as poetry is the moſt extenſive of thoſe arts, the moſt philoſophical, and the moſt uſeful.
THE PLEASURES OF IMAGINATION.
BOOK I.
MDCCLVII.
THE ſubject propoſed. Dedication. The ideas of the Supreme Being the exemplar [...] of all things. The variety of conſtitution in the minds of men, with its final cauſe. The general character of a fine Imagination. All the immediate Pleaſures of the human Imagination proceed either from greatneſs or beauty in external objects. The Pleaſure from great⯑neſs, with its final cauſe. The natural connexion of beauty with truth* and good. The different orders of beauty in different objects. The infinite and allcomprehending form of beauty, which belongs to the Divine Mind. The partial and artificial forms of beauty which belong to inferiour intellectual beings. The origin and general conduct of beauty in man. The ſubordination of local beauties to the beauty of the univerſe. Concluſion.
THE PLEASURES OF IMAGINATION.
BOOK II.
[]INTRODUCTION to this more difficult part of the ſubject. Of truth and its three claſſes, matter of fact, experimental or ſcientifical truth, (cont [...] diſtinguished from opinion) and univerſal truth; which laſt is either metaphyſical or geometrical, either purely intellectual or per⯑fectly a [...]acted. On the power of diſcerning truth depends that of acting with the view of an end, a circumſtance eſſential to virtue. Of virtue, conſidered in the Divine Mind as a perpetual and univerſal be⯑neficence. Of human virtue, conſidered as a ſyſem of particular ſen⯑timents and actions, ſuitable to the deſign of Providence and the con⯑dition of man, to whom it conſtitutes the chief good and the firſt beauty. Of vice and its origin. Of ridicule; its general nature and fi⯑nal cauſe [...] Of the paſſions, particularly of thoſe which relate to evil natural or moral, and which are generally accounted painful, though not always unattended with Pleaſure.
THE PLEASURES OF IMAGINATION.
BOOK III.
MDCCLXX.
[]THE BEGINNING OF THE FOURTH BOOK OF THE PLEASURES OF IMAGINATION.
MDCCLXX.
[]Appendix A CONTENTS.
[]- The Life of the Author, Page 5
- Advertiſement, 17
- The Deſign, 20
- The Pleaſures of Imagination, Book I. 25
- The Pleaſures of Imagination, Book II. 51
- The Pleaſures of Imagination, Book III. 83
- General Argument to the Pleaſures of Imagina⯑tion enlarged, 114
- The Pleaſures of Imagination enlarged, Book I. 116
- The Pleaſures of Imagination enlarged, Book II. 143
- The Pleaſures of Imagination enlarged, Book III. 168
- Beginning of Book IV. 187
Appendix B
From the APOLLO PRESS, by the MARTINS, Nov. [...]. 1781.
Appendix C
[]S [...] del.
D [...] Sc.
Printed for John Bell Britiſh Library Strand London. Feby. 7th. 1782.
℣. 234. —the neglect—Of all familiar proſpects, &c.] It is here ſaid that in conſequence of the love of novelty objects which at firſt were highly delightful to the mind loſe that [...] ⯑ſect by repeated attention to them; but the inſtance of [...] is oppoſed to this obſervation, for there objects at firſt diſtaſte⯑ful are in time rendered entirely agreeable by repeated atten⯑tion.
The difficulty in this caſe will be removed if we conſider that, when objects at firſt agreeable loſe that influence by fre⯑quently recurring, the mind is wholly paſſive and the percep⯑tion involuntary; but habit on the other hand generally ſup⯑poſes choice and activity accompanying it; ſo that the plea⯑ſure ariſes here not from the object but from the mind's con⯑ſcious determination of its own activity, and conſequently in⯑creaſes in proportion to the frequency of that determination.
It will ſtill be urged perhaps that a familiarity with diſagree⯑able objects renders them at length acceptable, even when there is no room for the mind to reſolve or act at all: in this caſe the appearance muſt be accounted for one of theſe ways:
The pleaſure from habit may be merely negative. The ob⯑ject at firſt gave uneaſineſs; this uneaſineſs gradually wears off as the object grows familiar; and the mind finding it at laſt en⯑tirely removed, reckons its ſituation really pleaſureable com⯑pared with what it had experienced before.
The diſlike conceived of the object at firſt might be owing to prejudice or want of attention; conſequently the mind be⯑ing neceſſitated to review it often may at length perceive its own miſtake, and be reconciled to what it had looked on with averſion; in which caſe a ſort of inſtinctive juſtice naturally leads it to make amends for the injury by running toward the other extreme of fondneſs and attachment.
Or, laſly, though the object itſelf ſhould always continue diſagreeable, yet circumſtances of pleaſure or good fortune may occur along with it: thus an aſſociation may ariſe in the mind and the object never be remembered without thoſe plea⯑ſing circumſtances attending it, by which means the diſa⯑greeable impreſſion which it at firſt occaſioned will in time be quite obliterated.
℣. 374. —Truth and Good are one,—And Beauty dweils in them. &c.] ‘"Do you imagine,"’ ſays Socrates to Ariſtippus, ‘"that what is good is not beautiful? have you not obſerved that theſe appearances always coincide? Virtue, for inſtance, in the ſame reſpect as to which we call it good is ever ac⯑knowledged to be beautiful alſo. In the characters of men we always join the two denominations together*. The beauty of human bodies correſponds in like manner with that economy of parts which conſtitutes them good, and in every circumſtance of life the ſame object is conſtantly ac⯑counted both beautiful and good, inaſmuch as it anſwers the purpoſes for which it was deſigned." Xenoph. Memorab. Socrat. lib. iii. cap. 8.’
This excellent obſervation has been illuſtrated and extended by the noble reſtorer of ancient philoſophy. See The Charac⯑teriſticks, vol. ii. p. 339 and 422, and vol. iii. p. 181. And an⯑other ingenious author has particularly ſhewn that it holds in the general laws of Nature, in the works of art, and the con⯑duct of the ſciences. Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, Treat. i. ſect. 8. As to the connexion be⯑tween beauty and truth, there are two opinions concerning it. Some philoſophers aſſert an independent and invariable law in Nature, in conſequence of which ‘"all rational beings muſt a⯑like perceive beauty in ſome certain proportions, and defor⯑mity in the contrary."’ And this neceſſity being ſuppoſed the [...]ame with that which commands the aſſent or diſſent of the underſtanding, it follows of courſe that beauty is founded on the univerſal and unchangeable law of truth.
But others there are who believe beauty to be merely a re⯑lative and arbitrary thing; that indeed it was a benevolent proviſion in Nature to annex ſo delightful a ſenſation to thoſe objects which are beſt and moſt perfect in themſelves, that ſo we might be engaged to the choice of them at once, and with⯑out having to infer their uſefulneſs from their ſtructure and effects; but that it is not impoſſible, in a phyſical ſenſe, that two beings of equal capacities for truth ſhould perceive one of them beauty and the other deformity in the ſame propor⯑tions. And upon this ſuppoſition, by that truth which is al⯑ways connected with beauty, nothing more can be meant than the conformity of any object to thoſe proportions upon which after careful examination the beauty of that ſpecies is found to depend. Polycietus, for inſtance, a famous ancient ſculptor, from an accurate menſuration of the ſeveral parts of the moſt perfect human bodies deduced a canon or ſyſtem of propor⯑tions which was the rule of all ſucceeding artiſts. Suppoſe a ſtatue modelled according to this, a man of mere natural taſte upon looking at it, without entering into its proportions, confeſſes and admires its beauty; whereas a profeſſor of the art applies his meaſures to the head, the neck, or the hand, and without attending to its beauty pronounces the workman⯑ſhip to be juſt and true.
℣. 304. Inhabitant of earth, &c] The account of the [...] ⯑nomy of Providence here introduced, as the moſt [...] and ſatisfy the mind when under the compunction [...] private evils, ſeems to have come originally from the Pytha⯑gorean ſchool; but of the ancient philoſophers Plato [...] largely inſiſted upon it, has eſtabliſhed it with all the [...] capacious underſtanding, and ennobled it with [...] magnificence of his divine imagination. He has one paſſage [...] full and clear on this head that I am perſuaded the reader [...] be pleaſed to ſee it here tho' ſomewhat long. Addreſſing [...] ſelf to ſuch as are not ſatisfied concerning divine Provide [...]; ‘"The being who preſides over the whole,"’ ſays he, ‘" [...] ⯑poſed and complicated all things for the happineſs and [...] ⯑tue of the whole, every part of which, according to the ex⯑tent of its influence, does and ſuffers what is fit and proper. One of theſe parts is your's, O unhappy man! which [...] itſelf moſt inconſiderable and minute, yet being connected with the univerſe ever ſeeks to cooperate with that ſupreme order. You in the mean-time are ignorant of the very end for which all particular natures are brought into exiſtence, that the all-comprehending nature of the whole may be perfect and happy; exiſting as it does not for your ſake, but the cauſe and reaſon of your exiſtence, which, as in the ſymmetry of every artificial work, muſt of neceſſity con [...] with the general deſign of the artiſt, and be ſubſervient to the whole, of which it is a part. Your complaint therefore is ignorant and groundleſs, ſince according to the v [...] [...] energy of creation and the common laws of Nature there [...] a conſtant proviſion of that which is beſt at the ſame time for you and for the whole.—For the governing Intelligen [...] clearly beholding all the actions of animated and [...] ⯑ving creatures, and that mixture of good and evil which [...] verſifies them, conſidered firſt of all by what diſpoſition of things, and by what ſituation of each individual in the ge⯑neral ſyſtem, vice might be depreſſed and ſubdued, and vir⯑tue made ſecure of victory and happineſs, with the greateſt facility, and in the higheſt degree poſſible: in this manner he ordered through the entire circle of being the internal conſtitution of every mind, where ſhould be its ſtation in the univerſal fabrick, and through what variety of circumſtan⯑ces it ſhould proceed in the whole tenour of its exiſtence."’ He goes on in his ſublime manner to aſſert a future ſtate of re⯑tribution, ‘"as well for thoſe who by the exerciſe of good diſ⯑poſitions being harmonized and aſſimilated into the divine virtue, are conſequently removed to a place of unblemiſhed ſanctity and happineſs, as of thoſe who by the moſt flagitious arts have riſen from contemptible beginnings to the greateſt affluence and power, and whom you therefore look upon as unanſwerable inſtances of negligence in the gods, becauſe you are ignorant of the purpoſes to which they are ſubſer⯑vient, and in what manner they contribute to that ſupreme intention of good to the whole." Plato de Leg. x. 16.’
This theory has been delivered of late eſpecially abroad, in a manner which ſubverts the freedom of human actions; whereas Plato appears very careful to preſerve it, and has been in that reſpect imitated by the beſt of his followers.
℣. 18. —where the pow'rs—Of fancy, &c.] The influ⯑ence of the Imagination on the conduct of life is one of the moſt important points in moral philoſophy. It were eaſy by an induction of facts to prove that the Imagination directs al⯑moſt all the paſſions, and mixes with almoſt everycircumſtance of action or pleaſure. Let any man, even of the coldeſt head and ſobereſt induſtry, analyze the idea of what he calls his In⯑tereſt, he will find that it conſiſts chiefly of certain degrees of decency, beauty, and order, variouſly combined into one ſy⯑ſtem, the idol which he ſeeks to enjoy by labour, hazard, and ſelfdenial. It is on this account of the laſt conſequence to re⯑gulate theſe images by the ſtandard of Nature and the general good, otherwiſe the Imagination, by heightening ſome objects beyond their real excellence and beauty, or by repreſenting others in a more odious or terrible ſhape than they deſerve, may of courſe engage us in purſuits utterly inconſiſtent with the moral order of things.
If it be objected that this account of things ſuppoſes the paſſions to be merely accidental, whereas there appears in ſome a natural and hereditary diſpoſition to certain paſſions, prior to all circumſtances of education or fortune, it may be an⯑ſwered, that though no man is born ambitious or a miſer, yet he may inherit from his parents a peculiar temper or com⯑plexion of mind which ſhall render his Imagination more li⯑able to be ſtruck with ſome particular objects, conſequently diſpoſe him to form opinions of good and ill, and entertain paſ⯑ſions of a particular turn. Some men, for inſtance, by the ori⯑ginal frame of their minds are more delighted with the vaſt and magnificent, others, on the contrary, with the elegant and gentle aſpects of Nature: and it is very remarkable that the diſpoſition of the moral powers is always ſimilar to this of the Imagination; that thoſe who are moſt inclined to admire prodigious and ſublime objects in the phyſical world are alſo moſt inclined to applaud examples of fortitude and heroick virtue in the moral; while thoſe who are charmed rather with the delicacy and ſweetneſs of colours, and forms, and ſounds, never fail, in like manner, to yield the preference to the ſofter ſcenes of virtue and the ſympathies of a domeſtick life. And this is ſufficient to account for the objection.
Among the ancient philoſophers though we have ſeveral hints concerning this influence of the Imagination upon mo⯑rals among the remains of the Socratick ſchool, yet the Stoicks were the firſt who paid it a due attention. Zeno their founder thought it impoſſible to preſerve any tolerable regularity in life without frequently inſpecting thoſe pictures or appearan⯑ces of things which the Imagination offers to the mind. Diog. Laert. l. vii. The Meditations of M. Aurelius, and The Diſ⯑courſes of Epictetus, are full of the ſame ſentiment, inſomuch that the latter makes the [...], or ‘"right management of the fancies,"’ the only thing for which we are accountable to Providence, and without which a man is no other than ſtupid or frantick. Arrian. l. i. c. 12. and l. ii. c. 22. See alſo The Characteriſticks, vol. I. from p. 313 to 321. where this ſtoical doctrine is embelliſhed with all the elegance and graces of Plato.
℣. 248. —Suffice it to have ſaid &c.] By comparing theſe general ſources of ridicule with each other, and examining the ridiculous in other objects, we may obtain a general de [...] ⯑ [...]tion of it equally applicable to every ſpecies. The moſt im⯑portant circumſtance of this de [...]ition is laid down in the lines referred to, but others more minute we ſhall ſubjoin here. A⯑riſtotle's account of the matter ſeems both imperfect and falſe; [...], ſays he, [...]: ‘"The ridiculous is ſome certain fault or turpitude without pain, and not deſtructive to its ſub⯑ject." Poet. c. 5.’ For allowing it to be true, as it is not, that the ridiculous is never accompanied with pain, yet we might produce many inſtances of ſuch a fault or turpitude which cannot with any tolerable propriety be called ridiculous, ſo that the definition does not diſtinguiſh the thing deſigned. Nay, farther, even when we perceive the turpitude tending to the deſtruction of its ſubject we may ſtill be ſenſible of a ridiculous appearance till the ruin become imminent, and the keener ſenſations of pity or terrour baniſh the ludicrous appre⯑henſion from our minds; for the ſenſation of ridicule is not a bare perception of the agreement or diſagreement of ideas, but a paſſion or emotion of the mind conſequential to that perception; ſo that the mind may perceive the agreement or diſagreement, and yet not feel the ridiculous, becauſe it is en⯑groſſed by a more violent emotion. Thus it happens that ſome men think thoſe objects ridiculous to which others can⯑not endure to apply the name, becauſe in them they excite a much intenſer and more important feeling: and this diffe⯑rence, among other cauſes, has brought a good deal of confu⯑ſion into this queſtion.
‘"That which makes objects ridiculous is ſome ground of admiration or eſteem connected with other more general circumſtances comparatively worthleſs or deformed; or it is ſome circumſtance of turpitude or deformity connected with what is in general excellent or beautiful; the incon⯑ſiſtent properties exiſting either in the objects themſelves, or in the apprehenſion of the perſon to whom they relate, belonging always to the ſame order or claſs of being, imply⯑ing ſentiment or deſign, and exciting no acute or vehement emotion of the heart."’
To prove the ſeveral parts of this definition: ‘"The appear⯑ance of excellence or beauty connected with a general con⯑dition comparatively ſordid or deformed"’ is ridiculous: for inſtance, pompous pretenſions of wiſdom, joined with ig⯑norance or folly, in the Socrates of Ariſtophanes, and the o⯑ſtentations of military glory with cowardice and ſtupidity, in the Thraſo of Terence.
‘"The appearance of deformity or turpitude in conjunction with what is in general excellent or venerable"’ is alſo ridi⯑culous: for inſtance, the perſonal weakneſſes of a magiſtrate appearing in the ſolemn and publick functions of his ſtation.
‘"The incongruous properties may either exiſt in the ob⯑jects themſelves, or in the apprehenſion of the perſon to whom they relate:"’ in the laſt mentioned inſtance they both exiſt in the objects; in the inſtances from Ariſtophanes and Terence one of them is objective and real, the other only [...]ounded in the apprehenſion of the ridiculous character.
‘"The inconſiſtent properties muſt belong to the ſame or⯑der or claſs of being."’ A coxcomb in fine clothes bedaubed by accident in foul weather is a ridiculous object; becauſe his general apprehenſion of excellence and eſteem is referred to the ſplendour and expenſe of his dreſs. A man of ſenſe and merit in the ſame circumſtances is not counted ridiculous, becauſe the general ground of excellence and eſteem in him is, both in fact and in his own apprehenſion, of a very different ſpecies.
‘"Every ridiculous object implies ſentiment or deſign."’ A column placed by an architect without a capital or baſe is laughed at; the ſame column in a ruin cauſes a very different ſenſation.
And, laſtly, ‘"the occurrence muſt excite no acute or vehe⯑ment emotion of the heart,"’ ſuch as terrour, pity, or indig⯑nation; for in that caſe, as was obſerved above, the mind is not at leiſure to contemplate the ridiculous.
Whether any appearance not ridiculous be involved in this deſcription, and whether it comprehend every ſpecies and form of the ridiculous, muſt be determined by repeated appli⯑cations of it to particular inſtances.
℣. 259. Aſk we for what fair end, &c.] Since it is beyond all contradiction evident that we have a natural ſenſe or feel⯑ing of the ridiculous, and ſince ſo good a reaſon may be aſſign⯑ed to juſtify the Supreme Being for beſtowing it, one cannot without aſtoniſhment reflect on the conduct of thoſe men who imagine it is for the ſervice of true religion to vilify and black⯑en it without diſtinction, and endeavour to perſuade us that it is never applied but in a bad cauſe. Ridicule is not con⯑cerned with mere ſpeculative truth or falſehood. It is not in abſtract propoſitions or theorems, but in actions and paſſions, good and evil, beauty and deformity, that we find materials for it; and all theſe terms are relative, implying approbation or blame. To aſk them whether ridicule be a teſt of truth is, in other words, to aſk whether that which is ridiculous can be morally true, can be juſt and becoming; or whether that which is juſt and becoming can be ridiculous: a queſtion that does not deſerve a ſerious anſwer; for it is moſt evident that, as in a me⯑taphyſical propoſition offered to the underſtanding for its aſſent, the faculty of reaſon examines the terms of the propoſition, and finding one idea which was ſuppoſed equal to another to be in fact unequal, of conſequence rejects the propoſition as a falſehood: ſo in objects offered to the mind for its eſteem or applauſe the faculty of ridicule finding an incongruity in the claim urges the mind to reject it with laughter and contempt. When therefore we obſerve ſuch a claim obtruded upon man⯑kind, and the inconſiſtent circumſtances carefully concealed from the eye of the publick, it is our buſineſs, if the matter be of importance to ſociety, to drag out thoſe latent circum⯑ſtances, and by ſetting them in full view to convince the world how ridiculous the claim is: and thus a double advantage is gained, for we both detect the moral falſehood ſooner than in the way of ſpeculative inquiry, and impreſs the minds of men with a ſtronger ſenſe of the vanity and errour of its authors. And this and no more is meant by the application of ridicule.
But it is ſaid the practice is dangerous, and may be incon⯑ſiſtent with the regard we owe to objects of real dignity and excellence. I anſwer, the practice fairly managed can never be dangerous: men may be diſhoneſt in obtruding circum⯑ſtances foreign to the object, and we may be inadvertent in allowing thoſe circumſtances to impoſe upon us; but the ſenſe of ridicule always judges right. The Socrates of Ariſto⯑phanes is as truly ridiculous a character as ever was drawn:—true; but it is not the character of Socrates, the divine mo⯑raliſt, and father of ancient wiſdom. What then? did the ri⯑dicule of the poet hinder the philoſopher from detecting and diſclaiming thoſe foreign circumſtances which he had falſely introduced into his character, and thus rendered the ſat [...] doubly ridiculous in his turn? No; but it nevertheleſs had an ill influence on the minds of the people. And ſo has the rea⯑ſoning of Spinoza made many Atheiſts: he has founded it in⯑deed on ſuppoſitions utterly falſe; but allow him theſe and his concluſions are unavoidably true. And if we muſt reject the uſe of ridicule becauſe by the impoſition of falſe circum⯑ſtances things may be made to ſeem ridiculous which are not ſo in themſelves, why we ought not in the ſame manner to reject the uſe of reaſon, becauſe by proceeding on falſe prin⯑ciples concluſions will appear true which are impoſſible in nature, let the vehement and obſtinate declaimers againſt ri⯑dicule determine.
- Citation Suggestion for this Object
- TextGrid Repository (2016). TEI. 4718 The poetical works of Mark Akenside In two volumes With the life of the author pt 1. University of Oxford Text Archive. University of Oxford, License: Distributed by the University of Oxford under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License [http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/]. https://hdl.handle.net/11378/0000-0005-D877-2